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### 1

#### Farm bill will pass – EPA decision gives it momentum

Wasson 11-19 – Staff writer at The Hill (Erik, “EPA ethanol decision pushes farm bill toward finish line”, November 19 of 2013, <http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/agriculture/190777-epa-ethanol-decision-pushes-farm-bill-toward-finish-line>)

The Environmental Protection Agency’s preliminary decision to reduce renewable fuels blending requirements has increased momentum to get a farm bill done this year, the top House negotiator on the measure said Tuesday. Rep. Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) argued that the ethanol decision, which is contributing to dropping corn prices, is helping all sides to come together behind a strong farm safety net. He added an agreement is needed this week to pass a farm bill before the Dec. 13 Christmas recess target date. Senate Agriculture Chairwoman Debbie Stabenow (D-Mich.) also told reporters Tuesday she is trying to get a framework agreement with the four top committee leaders this week or early next week. “That’s been my problem early on, that there was two different camps on how we should proceed and they’re absolute. Suddenly, with the change in weather patterns, production yields and now government mandated demand being adjusted down, suddenly that’s driving all of us together,” Lucas said. He said that the vulnerability of corn producers is helping resolve regional differences over whether the House or Senate farm subsidy approaches should be used. The downward prices also mean that the farm safety net as scored by the Congressional Budget Office will be more costly—giving negotiators an added incentive to complete a deal before CBO takes away some of their deficit-cutting bragging rights. The current bill cuts $13 billion to $20 billion from farm programs. On Friday, the EPA proposed draft 2014 blending volumes under the federal Renewable Fuel Standard that are lower than the 2013 requirements, and far less than called for in a 2007 law that expanded the mandate. The EPA is proposing to require 15.21 billion gallons in 2014, down from 16.55 billion gallons in 2013, marking the first time the agency has lowered the target from the prior year.

Plan trades off

Susan Page 13, USA Today, “How Obama can avoid the second-term curse,” 1-15-13, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/01/14/obama-second-term-curse/1834765/

"By the time a second term rolls around, the illusions about a president have largely evaporated," says Robert Dallek, one of those invited to the dinner and the author of influential biographies of Presidents Lyndon Johnson and John Kennedy. "In second terms, the big problems that confront the country, and they're always there, more or less catch up with the incumbent."¶ To be sure, some presidents have scored significant achievements in their second terms, from the tax code overhaul signed by Reagan to the balanced federal budget during Clinton's watch. But advisers who have been there say the rhythms and political dynamics of the second term are different from the first.¶"In the first term, you're running for re-election," says Ken Duberstein, White House chief of staff for Reagan during his second term. "In the second term, you're running for legacy." That impulse — "whether it's hubris or overreach or over-interpreting a mandate" — sometimes contributes to stumbles.¶ John Podesta, chief of staff for Clinton in his second term, says there's no "unifying physics theory" to explain the second-term curse, a concept that has become so accepted it has its own Wikipedia page. Despite that conventional wisdom, he says second terms also pose an opportunity for a president to deploy a more seasoned staff and exploit more executive powers.¶ USA TODAY asked top White House aides to Reagan, Clinton and Bush during their second terms for their tips, some reflecting hard lessons learned during their time in the West Wing. Here's what they told us.¶ 1. Watch the clock¶ The Constitution says there are four years to a second term, but political reality says a president's ability to command public attention and compel congressional action begins to ebb well before that. "People tend to get tired of their president in the second term," says Frank Donatelli, second-term White House political adviser to Reagan.¶ "Certainly history has proven that second-term presidents typically get the most accomplished in their first year and a little in their second and then not a lot accomplished as the party fights over who the next standard-bearer will be," says Sara Taylor Fagen, political adviser in Bush's second term.¶ That means Obama's major legislative initiatives for his second term probably need to be spotlighted in his inaugural address next week and detailed in the State of the Union speech that follows next month. His opportunities are likely to shrink as time passes, and fast.¶ "It's the Benjamin Button theory of the second term," says former Clinton White House aide Chris Lehane, a reference to the 2008 movie and F. Scott Fitzgerald short story. "You have a year to 16 months, max, to do anything, at least domestically. You're going to age in reverse."¶ At the midpoint of Bush's second term, press secretary Dana Perino saw attendance at daily White House briefings drop as reporters shifted to the 2008 campaign. "Toward the end, I said, 'If we are on the front page of the paper, we have done something terribly wrong or have a huge problem,'" says Perino, now co-host of The Five on Fox News Channel.¶ Another potential problem: The midterm congressional elections. The president's party often suffers big losses in the sixth year of a presidency, although Democrats already may have taken much of that hit in the 2010 elections, when they lost control of the House of Representatives. Democrats probably will have more muscle in Congress for the next two years than in the final two of Obama's term.¶ "There's a little bit of a feeling that you become chopped liver in your seventh and eighth years as the campaign heats up," says Podesta, who ran Obama's transition operation four years ago and is now chair of the Center for American Progress, a liberal-leaning think tank. "The play is going to move on."¶ 2. Pick a priority¶ The president can do something in his second term, the veterans say, but not everything. Fighting too many battles could mean winning none.

#### The farm bill is vital to multiple sectors for economic growth.

Baum, 11/22 (Janell contributor to Farm Futures, “White House Report Quantifies Farm Bill’s Economic Impact,” Farm Futures: Business and Marketing Tools for Profitable Farming, http://farmfutures.com/story-white-house-report-quantifies-farm-bills-economic-impact-0-105233-spx\_1)

The farm bill will contribute to domestic agriculture sector, its workforce, rural American communities, and families and businesses across the country, says a new report released Thursday by the White House Rural Council. Though not necessarily a new statement, the report containing it includes 48 pages of White House priorities for the farm bill, along with data that quantifies the size and scope of many of the sectors the bill is expected to impact. USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack, in a press call discussing the report, said it will likely serve as "ammunition" to get the work done on a new farm bill. Legislators from the House and Senate began talks to agree on a joint version of the bill Oct. 30. "This is a comprehensive and I think a compelling report that makes the argument on a multitude of levels why it's important for the rest of the country and for all of America to see Congress finish its work," Vilsack said. The report lays out specific goals for a new farm bill, including: building on momentum of the ag industry and rising farm income; contributing rural communities and infrastructure; supporting the bioeconomy; protecting nutrition assistance; developing a farm safety net; enhancing conservation and clean energy; promoting markets at home and abroad; and promoting research. Vilsack, who together with the Obama administration has previously outlined each of the goals during previous calls to action, touted the health of the ag sector as a linchpin in the call for a new bill. "This report documents that there's a direct relationship between the agricultural economy and the rest of the economy," Vilsack said, noting that nearly 5% of GDP is tied in some way to what happens on the farm.

#### The impact is nuclear war.

O’Hanlon et al, 12 (Michael and Kenneth, foreign policy scholars at the Brookings Institution, “the real national security threat: america’s debt,” 7/3, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/03/opinion/la-oe-ohanlon-fiscal-reform-20120703)

Lastly, American economic weakness undercuts U.S. leadership abroad. Other countries sense our weakness and wonder about our purported decline. If this perception becomes more widespread, and the case that we are in decline becomes more persuasive, countries will begin to take actions that reflect their skepticism about America's future. Allies and friends will doubt our commitment and may pursue nuclear weapons for their own security, for example; adversaries will sense opportunity and be less restrained in throwing around their weight in their own neighborhoods. The crucial Persian Gulf and Western Pacific regions will likely become less stable. Major war will become more likely. When running for president last time, Obama eloquently articulated big foreign policy visions: healing America's breach with the Muslim world, controlling global climate change, dramatically curbing global poverty through development aid, moving toward a world free of nuclear weapons. These were, and remain, worthy if elusive goals. However, for Obama or his successor, there is now a much more urgent big-picture issue: restoring U.S. economic strength. Nothing else is really possible if that fundamental prerequisite to effective foreign policy is not reestablished.

### 2

#### Text: The United States federal government should pass H.R. 2216, the NADBank Enhancement Act.

#### NADBank restrictions prevent investment – counter plan solves.

Balido, 11 (Nelson, President of the Border Trade Alliance, “Bill to expand NADBank projects holds potential to make big impact for border,” August 29, <http://www.thebta.org/btanews/bill-to-expand-nadbank-projects-holds-potential-to-make-big-impact-for-border.html>)

Over the past sixteen years of operation, the NADBank has been vitally important to improving basic services in the border region by financing numerous water, wastewater, solid waste and street paving projects, among others. To date, NADBank has provided approximately $1.24 billion in loans and grants to support 149 infrastructure projects in the border region, which represents a total investment of $3.26 billion and will benefit more than 12.8 million residents of the region.¶ One particularly notable accomplishment is the significant improvement in wastewater treatment coverage on the Mexican side of the border. In 1995, it was estimated that 27 percent of wastewater generated in border communities was being treated. According to Mexico’s National Water Commission (CONAGUA), wastewater treatment coverage has now reached approximately 85 percent. This dramatic improvement is in large part due to the work of NADBank.¶ The bank remains limited, however, in the projects it can finance. Its charter permits the bank only to get involved in projects deemed to have a significant positive environmental impact. There have been cases where the NADBank has taken interest in projects involving international ports of entry that would benefit an area’s economy and create new jobs. Yet the bank has been unable to deliver financing to such projects, over the objections of its board of directors, for not demonstrating a sufficient environmental benefit to merit NADBank financing.¶ Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-Texas) has introduced a bill, H.R. 2216, the NADBank Enhancement Act of 2011, which would broaden the scope of projects where the bank could provide financing. This would include projects that promote trade and commerce between the U.S. and Mexico, including port of entry modernization and construction projects.¶ Perhaps the best thing about the bill is that it doesn’t add a dime to the federal deficit or debt. Rather, the bill will help ensure NADBank’s existing capital is more fully utilized for the benefit of the U.S.-Mexico border region, and ultimately for the benefit of both the U.S. and Mexico.¶ The NADBank isn’t going to solve the nation’s infrastructure woes. NADBank is and will continue to be a bank focused on the border region. But the potential is there for the bank to move beyond its traditional scope of financing U.S.-Mexico border region water quality and wastewater projects and get involved in financing additional border area infrastructure projects that could improve the area’s quality of life and provide a needed boost to the region’s economy.

### 3

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies unconditionally means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 4

**Text: The United States federal government should condition substantially increasing its infrastructure assistance with Mexico through the North American Development Bank on the federal government of Mexico meeting the four human rights requirements of the Mérida Initiative. The United States federal government should decide if the federal government of Mexico meets these requirements based off the findings of Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos.**

#### Solves the AFF and boosts our human rights cred

**WOLA 10** - (Washington Office of Latin America- contains multiple experts on human rights abuse in latin america and quotes the state department's report "Congress: Withhold Funds for Mexico Tied to Human Rights Performance" 9/14/10, <http://www.wola.org/publications/congress_withhold_funds_for_mexico_tied_to_human_rights_performance>)

The US government significantly strengthened its partnership with Mexico in combating organized crime in 2007 when it announced the Merida Initiative, a multi-year US security assistance package for Mexico. To date, the US government has allocated roughly $1.5 billion in Merida funding to Mexico. From the outset, the US Congress recognized the importance of ensuring that the Mexican government respect human rights in its public security efforts, mandating by law that 15 percent of select Merida funds be withheld until the State Department issued a report to the US Congress which showed that Mexico had demonstrated it was meeting four human rights requirements. ¶ ¶ On September 2, 2010, the State Department issued its second report to Congress concluding that Mexico is meeting the Merida Initiative’s human rights requirements, and it stated its intention to obligate roughly $36 million in security assistance that had been withheld from the 2009 supplemental and the 2010 omnibus budgets. ¶ However, research conducted by our respective organizations, Mexico’s National Human Rights Commission, and even the State Department’s own reports, demonstrates conclusively that Mexico has failed to meet the four human rights requirements set out by law. As a result, Congress should not release these select Merida funds. Releasing these funds would send the message that the United States condones the grave human rights violations committed in Mexico, including torture, rape, killings, and enforced disappearances.¶ We recognize that Mexico is facing a severe public security crisis, and that the United States can play a constructive role in strengthening Mexico’s ability to confront organized crime in an effective manner. However, human rights violations committed by Mexican security forces are not only deplorable in their own right, but also significantly undermine the effectiveness of Mexico’s public security efforts. Building trust between the Mexican people and the government is essential to gathering information to dismantle organized crime. When security forces commit grave human rights violations and they are not held accountable for their actions, they lose that trust, alienating key allies and leaving civilians in a state of terror and defenselessness. It is thus in the interest of both of our countries to help Mexico curb systematic human rights violations, ensure that violations are effectively investigated and those responsible held accountable, and assess candidly the progress Mexico is making towards improving accountability and transparency. ¶ Evidence demonstrates that Mexico is not fulfilling effectively any of the requirements established by Congress, particularly those dealing with prosecuting military abuses and torture:

#### HR cred solves conflict

Burke-White 4 (William W., Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University The Harvard Environmental Law Review Spring, 2004 LN,<https://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/wburkewh/workingpapers/17HarvHumRtsJ249(2004).pdf>)

This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [\*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security.¶ Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. n2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.

### Water

#### Food wars don’t escalate

**Salehyan, 07** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Northern Texas (Idean, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August 2007, May 29th 2010, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>, KONTOPOULOS)

Dire scenarios like these may sound convincing, but they are misleading. Even worse, they are irresponsible, for they shift liability for wars and human rights abuses away from oppressive, corrupt governments. Additionally, focusing on climate change as a security threat that requires a military response diverts attention away from prudent adaptation mechanisms and new technologies that can prevent the worst catastrophes. First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is little systematic empirical evidence that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, several studies have shown that an abundance of natural resources is more likely to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a steep decline in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters. Second, arguing that climate change is a root cause of conflict lets tyrannical governments off the hook. If the environment drives conflict, then governments bear little responsibility for bad outcomes. That’s why Ban Ki-moon’s case about Darfur was music to Khartoum’s ears. The Sudanese government would love to blame the West for creating the climate change problem in the first place. True, desertification is a serious concern, but it’s preposterous to suggest that poor rainfall—rather than deliberate actions taken by the Sudanese government and the various combatant factions—ultimately caused the genocidal violence in Sudan. Yet by Moon’s perverse logic, consumers in Chicago and Paris are at least as culpable for Darfur as the regime in Khartoum.

#### [ ] Abundance causes conflict, not shortage

**Dupont, 08** – Michael Hintze Professor of International Security and Director of the Centre for International Security Studies @ U of Sydney (Alan, June 2008, Survival, Vol. 50, Iss. 3, “The Strategic Implications of Climate Change”, p. 43)

Many of these projections are highly speculative or simply misleading, betraying the authors’ lack of specialised knowledge of the realities of inter national security. A case in point is the mischaracterisation of LeBlanc’s position. In fact, LeBlanc made a much more sophisticated and in some places contrary argument – that when people live in states they will often starve rather than fight, ‘because the government won’t allow them to fight’.49 Similarly, the proposition that South Korea and Japan would develop nuclear weapons as they diversify away from fossil fuels to nuclear power is highly questionable because it ignores the very real domestic and international constraints on either country going nuclear.50 South Korea and Japan have eschewed nuclear weapons despite the fact that they have long produced much of their electricity from nuclear power plants. It is drawing a long bow indeed to suggest that abrupt climate change alone would lead either to reconsider their long-standing aversion to nuclear weapons.

#### [ ] Resource scarcity spurs innovation which prevents resource wars

**Meierding, 07** – Ph.D. Student at the University of Chicago (Emily, “Strategic Substitution and the Declining Likelihood of International Resource Wars”, March 2007 prepared for the International Studies Association Conference)

If these intra-disciplinary critics collectively call into question the resource pessimists’ claim that resource scarcity frequently leads to violent conflict, a more fundamental critique has emerged from resource economists. Resource “cornucopians” argue that the very concept of scarcity is flawed. Julian Simon, the most prominent of these claimants, asserts that market demand for increasingly scarce goods inspires technological innovation, which resolves supply problems through improvements in productive efficiency or through the creation of substitute inputs. When consumers demand a resource, more of it, or of a functional substitute, is supplied. Human knowledge, he claims, is “the ultimate resource.” The cornucopian argument suggests that natural resource scarcity should not have a significant impact on the likelihood of conflict. Future resource-inspired violence will be rare.

### Warming

#### No impact to warming

**Goklany 11** - a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior (Indur M., “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming” December 2011, <http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf>, PZ)

A third approach would be to fix the root cause of why developing countries are deemed to be most at-risk, namely, poverty. Sustained economic growth would, as is evident from the experience of developed countries, address virtually all problems of poverty, not just that portion exacerbated by global warming. It is far more certain that sustainable economic growth will provide greater benefits than emission reductions: while there is no doubt that poverty leads to disease and death, **there is substantial doubt regarding the reality and magnitude of the negative impact of global warming. This is especially true as assessments often ignore improvements in adaptive capacity.** Of these three approaches, human well-being in poorer countries is likely to be advanced most effectively by sustained economic development and least by emission reductions. In addition, because of the inertia of the climate system, economic development is likely to bear fruit faster than any emission reductions.These figures also indicate that the compound effect of economic development and technological change can result in quite dramatic improvements even over the relatively short period for which these figures were developed. Figure 5, for instance, covered 26 years. By contrast, **climate change impacts analyses frequently look 50 to 100 years into the future**. Over such long periods, the compounded effect could well be spectacular**. Longer term analyses of climate-sensitive indicators of human well-being show that the combination of** economic growth and technological change can, over decades, reduce negative impacts on human beings by an order of magnitude, that is, **a factor of ten, or more**. In some instances, **this combination has virtually eliminated such negative impacts.** But, **since impact assessments generally fail to fully account for increases in economic development and technological change, they substantially** overestimate future net damages from global warming. It may be argued that the high levels of economic development depicted in Figure 6 are unlikely. But if that’s the case, then economic growth used to drive the IPCC’s scenarios are equally unlikely, which necessarily means that the estimates of emissions, temperature increases, and impacts and damages of GW projected by the IPCC are also overestimates.B. Secular Technological Change **The second major reason why future adaptive capacity has been underestimated** (**and the impacts of global warming systematically overestimated) is that few impact studies consider secular technological change.** 25 **Most assume that no new technologies will come on line**, although some do assume greater adoption of existing technologies with higher GDP per capita and, much less frequently, a modest generic improvement in productivity. 26 Such an assumption may have been appropriate during the Medieval Warm Period, when the pace of technological change was slow, but nowadays technological change is fast (as indicated in Figures 1 through 5) and, arguably, accelerating. 27 It is unlikely that we will see a halt to technological change unless so-called precautionary policies are instituted that count the costs of technology but ignore its benefits, as some governments have already done for genetically modified crops and various pesticides. So how much of a difference in impact would consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, **the time horizon of climate change impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more.** The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of 1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. **Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human capital**. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that **over the span of a few decades, changes in economic development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental impacts and improve human well-being, as measured by a variety of objective indicators.** 41 **Thus, not fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders of magnitude** if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is invalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0 to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100.

#### Icebergs are a negative feedback – none of their evidence takes this into account

**Macfarlane, 09** (Jo, The Daily Mail Online. “Amazing discovery of green algae which could save the world from global warming” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-1104772/Amazing-discovery-green-algae-save-world-global-warming.html?ITO=1490#)

Melting icebergs, so long the iconic image of global warming, are triggering a natural process that could delay or even end climate change, British scientists have found. A team working on board the Royal Navy’s HMS Endurance off the coast of Antarctica have discovered tiny particles of iron are released into the sea as the ice melts. The iron feeds algae, which blooms and sucks up damaging carbon dioxide (CO2), then sinks, locking away the harmful greenhouse gas for hundreds of years. The team think the process could hold the key to staving off globally rising temperatures. Lead researcher Professor Rob Raiswell, from Leeds University, said: ‘The Earth itself seems to want to save us.’ As a result of the findings, a ground-breaking experiment will be held this month off the British island of South Georgia, 800 miles south east of the Falklands. It will see if the phenomenon could be harnessed to contain rising carbon emissions. Researchers will use several tons of iron sulphate to create an artificial bloom of algae. The patch will be so large it will be visible from space. Scientists already knew that releasing iron into the sea stimulates the growth of algae. But environmentalists had warned that to do so artificially might damage the planet’s fragile ecosystem. Last year, the UN banned iron fertilisation in the Great Southern Ocean. However, the new findings show the mechanism has actually been operating naturally for millions of years within the isolated southern waters. And it has led to the researchers being granted permission by the UN to move ahead with the experiment. The scientist who will lead the next stage of the study, Professor Victor Smetacek, said: ‘The gas is sure to be out of the Earth’s atmosphere for several hundred years.’ The aim is to discover whether artificially fertilising the area will create more algae in the Great Southern Ocean. That ocean is an untapped resource for soaking up CO2 because it doesn’t have much iron, unlike other seas. It covers 20million square miles, and scientists say that if this could all be treated with iron, the resulting algae would remove three-and-a-half gigatons of carbon dioxide. This is equivalent to one eighth of all emissions annually created by burning fossil fuels such as oil, gas and coal. It would also be equal to removing all carbon dioxide emitted from every power plant, chimney and car exhaust in the rapidly expanding industries of India and Japan. However, the experts warn it is too early to say whether it will work. The team from ice patrol ship HMS Endurance used sledgehammers to chip deep into the interior of a 33ft-long mass of polar ice from half-a-dozen house-sized icebergs that had blown ashore in Antarctica. Once back in the UK, they used a special microscope to analyse the samples, which revealed what they had been looking for – tiny iron particles, only a few millionths of a millimetre wide, embedded deep within the ice. Until now, it was thought that the only source of iron in the Southern Ocean was wind blowing in metal compounds from the deserts of nearby continents like Australia. But the research has disproved this. Prof Raiswell said: ‘These particles measure only a fraction of a millimetre, but they have great importance for the global climate.’ Rising global temperatures, particularly over the past 50 years, have increased the rate at which polar ice melts, causing sea levels to rise. Ten of the warmest years on record have been since 1991, with experts predicting that 2009 could be the hottest year yet. The climate-change effect is set to substantially increase over the coming decades, as developing industrial nations pump out more CO2. Temperatures along the Antarctic Peninsula alone have increased by 2.5C over the past 50 years. But for every percentage point increase in the amount of ice that breaks off, Prof Raiswell calculates that a further 26million tons of CO2 is removed from the atmosphere.

#### Growing emissions in developing countries make CO2 reduction impossible – modeling is irrelevant

**Koetzle, 08** – Ph.D. and Senior Vice President of Public Policy at the Institute for Energy Research (William, “IER Rebuttal to Boucher White Paper”, 4/13/2008, http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/04/13/ier-rebuttal-to-boucher-white-paper/)

For example, if the United States were to unilaterally reduced emissions by 30% or 40% below 2004 levels[8] by 2030; net global CO2 emissions would still increase by more than 40%. The reason is straightforward: either of these reduction levels is offset by the increases in CO2 emissions in developing countries. For example, a 30% cut below 2004 levels by 2030 by the United States offsets less than 60% of China’s increase in emissions during the same period. In fact, even if the United States were to eliminate all CO2 emissions by 2030, without any corresponding actions by other countries, world-wide emissions would still increase by 30%. If the United States were joined by the other OECD countries in a CO2 reduction effort, net emissions would still significantly increase. In the event of an OCED-wide reduction of 30%, global emissions increase by 33%; a reduction of 40% still leads to a net increase of just under 30%. Simply put, in order to hold CO2 emissions at 2004 levels, absent any reductions by developing nations like China and India, all OECD emissions would have to cease.[9] The lack of participation by all significant sources of GHGs not only means it is unlikely that net reductions will occur; it also means that the cost of meaningful reductions is increased dramatically. Nordhous (2007) for example, argues that for the “importance of near-universal participation to reduce greenhouse gases.”[10] His analysis shows that GHG emission reduction plans that include, for example, 50% of world-wide emissions impose additional costs of 250 percent. Thus, he find’s GHG abatement plans like Kyoto (which does not include significant emitters like the United States, China, and India) to be “seriously flawed” and “likely to be ineffective.” [11] Even if the United States had participated, he argues that Kyoto would make “but a small contribution to slowing global warming, and it would continue to be highly inefficient.”[12]The data on emissions and economic analysis of reduction programs make it clear that GHG emissions are a global issue. Actions by localities, sectors, states, regions or even nations are unlikely to effectively reduce net global emissions unless these reductions are to a large extent mirrored by all significant emitting nations.

### Manufacturing

**No impact to hegemonic decline – their studies are wrong**

**MacDonald, 11** - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. **The** central **issue is whether** **prompt retrenchment** **is** **desirable** or probable. Some **pessimists counsel** that **retrenchment is** a **dangerous** policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert **Kagan**, for example, **warns, "A reduction** in defense spending . . . **would unnerve** American **allies and undercut** efforts to gain greater **cooperation**. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert **Kaplan** likewise **argues**, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on **being more of an offshore balancer**. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention **may encourage regional bullies**. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3 Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7 **These arguments have** **grim implications for** contemporary **international politics**. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, **if the pessimists are correct**, **politicians and interests groups in the U**nited **S**tates **will be** **unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments**. **Perceptions of weakness and** **declining U.S. credibility** **will encourage policymakers to** **hold on to burdensome overseas commitments**, **despite their high costs** in blood and treasure.9 **Policymakers** in Washington **will** **struggle to retire** **from profitless military engagements** and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11 In this article, **we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists**. To date **there has been** **neither a comprehensive study** **of great power retrenchment** **nor a study that lays out the case** for retrenchment **as a practical or probable policy**. **This article fills these gaps by** **systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers**. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, **we challenge the** retrenchment pessimists' **claim that** **domestic or international constraints** **inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench**. In fact, **when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers**, **peaceful retrenchment is the most common response**, **even over short time spans**. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. **When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies** or adversaries, **draw down** their military **obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations**. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, **great powers retrench for the same reason they expand**: the rigors of **great power politics compel them** to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and **declining great powers face** **powerful incentives to contract their interests in a** **prompt and proportionate manner.** Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that **great powers facing acute decline are** **less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes**. **Faced with diminishing resources**, **great powers** **moderate their foreign policy ambitions** **and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value**. **Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions** **of critics,** **retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. **Great powers** are able to **rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, **retrenchment can be successful**. **States that retrench** **often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers**. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

**Obama’s getting the U.S. out of heg now—the aff props up heg, causing great power conflict and a violent transition to multipolarity**

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As for **the administration’s involvement in the ‘Arab Spring’**, and latterly military intervention from the air in Libya, these episodes also **serve better to** **illustrate Obama’s tendency towards restraint and limitation** **than to showcase bold ambition**. Both its record of public statements during the unfolding of the Egyptian ‘revolution’ and inside accounts after the event suggest that **the administration’s strategy was to ride with caution a wave of events largely beyond its own control.** The United States thus edged over a period of days from expressing confidence in Mubarak to seeking a months-long quasi-constitutional transition to eventually facilitating his abrupt defenestration, as events on the ground changed the balance of probabilities as to the ultimate outcome. **In eschewing either rigid public support for Mubarak**, as some regional allies would have preferred, **or early and vocal backing for the protesters**, **Obama was successful** in what was surely the primary objective: **to avoid rendering America’s interests hostage to a gamble on either the success or the failure of the protests**. 91 Given Egypt’s strategic importance, such ‘dithering’, as contemporary critics often termed it, might justifiably be praised as a sensible reluctance to run out ahead of events. 92 **In its approach to Libya, the administration seems similarly to have been guided more by the movement of events on the ground than by any overarching plan**, and to have retained a default instinct of reluctance throughout. 93 The decision to intervene directly with air power was made only after it became clear that anti-Qadhafi rebels were in imminent danger of total defeat in their last redoubt of Benghazi, after which bloody reprisals by the government against disloyal citizens could be expected. In a major presidential address to the American people regarding operations in Libya, a chief priority was to reassure them as to the limits of the operation. The President insisted that his decisions had been ‘consistent with the pledge that I made to the American people at the outset … that America’s role would be limited; that we would not put ground troops into Libya; that we would focus our unique capabilities on the front end of the operation and that we would transfer responsibility to our allies and partners.’ Once the first wave of bombing was complete, he explained, the United States would retreat to ‘a supporting role’, with the transfer of responsibility to others ensuring that ‘the risk and cost of this operation—to our military and to American taxpayers—will be reduced significantly’. **Although it was right and necessary for the US to intervene**, he said, **there would be** **no question of using American resources** on the ground **to achieve regime change or nation-building**. ‘To be blunt,’ he observed, ‘**we went down that road in Iraq … That is not something we can afford to repeat in Libya.**’ **His vision of leadership was one whereby** **the US reserved the right to use unilateral military force** to defend ‘our people, our homeland, our allies and our core interests’, **but** **in cases where ‘our safety is not directly threatened**, but our interests and our values are … **the burden of action should not be America’s alone’.** ‘**Real leadership’**, he argued, ‘**creates the conditions and coalitions for others to step up as well**; to work with allies and partners so that they bear their share of the burden and pay their share of the costs.’ 94 On the very same day that Obama outlined his vision for American and western leadership in the defence of liberal values at Westminster in May 2011, he also made remarks at a press conference with Prime Minister David Cameron that underlined the limits of what America would contribute to the campaign in Libya, making it apparent that the high-flown ideals of Westminster Hall would be closely circumscribed in their implementation in practice. 95 It was explications such as these of **the meaning of American ‘leadership’ in the new era** that **inspired the** unfortunate **phrase ‘leading from behind’**. 96 Thus **the chief message emanating from the Libyan intervention was not**, in fact, **broad endorsement of liberal intervention** as a general principle. Rather, one of the clearest signals from the President was that nothing resembling the resourceintensive operation in Iraq (or perhaps, by implication, Afghanistan) could or should ever be attempted again. Captain of a shrinking ship As noted in the opening passages of this article, **the narratives of** **America’s decline and Obama’s restraint** **are** distinct but also **crucially connected**. **Facing this incipient period of decline**, **America’s leaders may walk one of two paths**. **Either the nation can come to terms with the reality of the process that is under way and** seek to **finesse it in the smoothest way possible**. **Or it can** **‘rage against the dying of the light’**, **refusing to accept the waning of its primacy**. President **Obama’s approach**, **defined by** **restraint and awareness of limits**, **makes him ideologically and temperamentally well suited to the former course in a way that**, to cite one example, **his predecessor was not**. **He is**, in short, **a good president to inaugurate an era of managed decline**. **Those who** vocally **demand** that **the President act more boldly** are not merely criticizing him; in suggesting that he is ‘weak’ and that a ‘tougher’ policy is needed, they **implicitly suppose that the resources will be available to support such a course**. In doing so **they set their faces against the reality of the coming American decline**. 97 **If** **the U**nited **S**tates **can embrace** the spirit of **managed decline**, then **this will** **clear the way for a judicious retrenchment**, **trimming ambitions in line with the fact that the nation can no longer act on the global stage with the wide latitude once afforded by its superior power**. As part of such a project, **it can**, as those who seek to qualify the decline thesis have suggested, **use the significant resources still at its disposal to** **smooth the edges of its loss of relative power**, **preserving influence to the maximum extent** possible **through whatever legacy of norms and institutions is bequeathed by its primacy**. **The alternative course** **involves the** **initiation or escalation of conflictual scenarios** **for which the U**nited **S**tates **increasingly** **lacks the resources** to cater: provocation of a military conclusion to the impasse with Iran; **deliberate escalation of strategic rivalry with China** in East Asia; commitment to continuing the campaign in Afghanistan for another decade; a costly effort to consistently apply principles of military interventionism, regime change and democracy promotion in response to events in North Africa. President Obama does not by any means represent a radical break with the traditions of American foreign policy in the modern era. Examination of his major foreign policy pronouncements reveals that he remains within the mainstream of the American discourse on foreign policy. In his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in December 2009 he made it clear, not for the first time, that he is no pacifist, spelling out his view that ‘the instruments of war do have a role to play in preserving the peace’, and that ‘the United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strength of our arms’. 98 In his Cairo speech in June the same year, even as he sought distance from his predecessor with the proclamation that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed by one nation on any other’, he also endorsed with only slight qualification the liberal universalist view of civil liberties as transcendent human rights. ‘I … have an unyielding belief that all people yearn for certain things,’ he declared. ‘The ability to speak your mind and have a say in how you are governed; confidence in the rule of law and the equal administration of justice; government that is transparent and doesn’t steal from the people; the freedom to live as you choose. These are not just American ideas.’ 99 His Westminster speech repeated these sentiments. Evidently **this is not a president who wishes to break signally with the mainstream,** **either by** **advocating a radical shrinking of America’s military strength** **as a good in itself or** **by disavowing liberal universalist global visions**, as some genuine dissidents from the prevailing foreign policy discourse would wish. 100 No doubt sensibly, given the likely political reaction at home, it is inconceivable that he would explicitly declare his strategy to be one of managed American decline. **Nevertheless, this is a president who**, **within the confines of the mainstream,** **embraces caution and restraint** **to the greatest extent that one could hope for without an epochal paradigm shift** in the intellectual framework of American foreign policy-making. 101 In contemplating the diminished and diminishing weight of the United States upon the scales of global power, it is important not to conflate the question of what will be with that of what we might prefer. It may well be, as critics of the decline thesis sometimes observe, that the prospect of increased global power for a state such as China should not, on reflection, fill any westerner with glee, whatever reservations one may have held regarding US primacy. It is also important not to be unduly deterministic in projecting the consequences of **American decline**. It **may be a process that unfolds** **gradually and peacefully,** **resulting in a new order that** **functions with peace and stability** **even in the absence of American primacy**. **Alternatively, it may result in conflict, if the U**nited **S**tates **clashes with rising powers as it refuses to relinquish the prerogatives of the hegemon**, **or continues to be** **drawn into wars with middle powers** or on the periphery in spite of its shrinking capacity to afford them. **Which outcome occurs** **will** **depend on** more than the **choices** of America alone. But **the likelihood that the U**nited **S**tates **can preserve its** prosperity and **influence** **and see its hegemony leave a positive legacy** **rather than go down thrashing** its limbs about destructively **will be greatly increased if it has political leaders disposed to minimize conflict and consider American power a scarce resource**—in short, **leaders who can master** the art of **declining politely**. **At present** it seems **it is fortunate enough to have a president who fits the bill**.

**More evidence – this is the 1AC card – heg isn’t inevitable**

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**Since the end of World War II, the U**nited **S**tates **has pursued a single grand strategy:** deep engagement. **In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map**, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea.¶ The **details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years,** every president **has agreed on the fundamental decision** to remain deeply engaged **in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted**. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. **Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster** the **cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order.¶ Now, more than ever, Washington might be tempted to abandon this grand strategy and pull back from the world. The rise of China is chipping away at the United States' preponderance of power, a budget crisis has put defense spending on the chopping block, and two long wars have left the U.S. military and public exhausted. Indeed, even as most politicians continue to assert their commitment to global leadership,** a very different view has taken hold among scholars of international relations over the past decade: that the United States should minimize its overseas military presence, shed its security ties, and give up its efforts to lead the liberal international order.¶

**Best data proves unipolar systems are substantially more war-prone than multipolar alternatives – causes offshore balancing**

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**How well**, then, **does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War?** Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. **Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war** **and the** **incidence of war involving great powers**. **In multipolarity,** **18 percent of great power years were spent at war.** **In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent**. **In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war**. **This is** **by far the highest percentage in all three systems**. Furthermore, **during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity**, **the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was**, respectively, **4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18**.2 percent—or **more than four times higher**.47 **These figures provide** **no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful**.48

**Offshore Balancing solves US-Chinese relations and war over Taiwan**

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**Washington**, however, **faces** perhaps **a last chance to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in ensuring that Chinese power is contained in East Asia but without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. This strategy is "offshore balancing**," a concept that is finding increasing favor with a group of influential American scholars in the field of security studies. According to this strategy; the United States should deploy military power abroad only in the face of direct threats to vital American interests. The strategy recognizes that Washington need not (and in fact cannot) directly control vast parts of the globe, that it is better off setting priorities based on clear national interests and relying on local actors to uphold regional balances of power. **The idea of offshore balancing is to husband national power for maximum effectiveness while minimizing per ceptions that this power represents a threat. As an offshore balancer in East Asia, the United States would embrace a new set of policies regarding Sino-American economic relations, political liberalization in China, the defense of Taiwan, and America's strategic posture in the region. An offshore balancing strategy would require the United States to approach economic relations with China based on a policy of strategic trade rather than free trade. A strategic trade policy would seek to curtail the flow of high technology and direct investment from the United States to China. It also would require a shift in current US trade policy to drastically reduce the bilateral trade deficit, which is a de facto American subsidy oj the very economic growth that is fueling China's great power emergence**. **Second, the United States would abandon its efforts to effectuate political liberalization in China. This policy is a form of gratuitous eye-poking. Because the United States lacks sufficient leverage to transform China domestically; the primary effect of trying to force liberalization on China is to inflame Sino-American relations. An offshore balancing strategy also would require a new US stance on Taiwan, a powder-keg issue because China is committed to national reunification and would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. If us policy fails to prevent a showdown between China and Taiwan, the odds are that America will be drawn into the conflict because of its current East Asia strategy**. There would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of us intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese military action against Taiwan would constitute aggression and undermine us interests in a stable world order, powerful incentives for intervention would also arise from ideological antipathy toward China, concerns for maintaining us "credibility;" and support for a democratic Taiwan in a conflict with authoritarian China.

**Sino relations solve extinction**

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I. Introduction In the Twenty-First Century, **China's relations with the U**nited **S**tates **will be its most important foreign relationship. For the U**nited **S**tates**, no other country will have a greater influence on its future global status than China. For the world, the Sino-U.S. relationship in the coming decades will become increasingly significant. A** stable and **cooperative relationship** between the two countries would **be a cornerstone for a more harmonious world; however, the corrosion of this relationship would have tremendously harmful consequences** not only for the two peoples, who account for more than one-fourth of mankind, but **for** the rest of **the world** as well.